The analysis of genetic and epigenetic mechanisms of the genotype–phenotypic connection has, so far, only been possible in a handful of genetic model systems. Recent technological advances, including next‐generation sequencing methods such as RNA‐seq, ChIP‐seq and RAD‐seq, and genome‐editing approaches including CRISPR‐Cas, now permit to address these fundamental questions of biology also in organisms that have been studied in their natural habitats. We provide an overview of the benefits and drawbacks of these novel techniques and experimental approaches that can now (...) be applied to ecological and evolutionary vertebrate models such as sticklebacks and cichlid fish. We can anticipate that these new methods will increase the understanding of the genetic and epigenetic factors influencing adaptations and phenotypic variation in ecological settings. These new arrows in the methodological quiver of ecologist will drastically increase the understanding of the genetic basis of adaptive traits – leading to a further closing of the genotype–phenotype gap. -/- . (shrink)

Previous research has underlined the significance of practical wisdom pertaining to corporate sustainability. Recent studies, however, have identified managing opposing but interlocked tensions related to environmental, social, and economic aspects as one of the most crucial future challenges in CS. Therefore, we apply the established link between wisdom and sustainability to the pressing topic of managing tensions in CS. We commence with a literature overview of tensions in sustainability management, which manifests our basic work assumption concerning the need for practical (...) wisdom in CS. We then discuss the threefold, mutual interconnectedness between practical wisdom and tension management in CS, which we illustrate in a conceptual model. Thereafter, we develop a set of propositions on how a practical wisdom approach influences CS in practice and how it differs from a business-case approach. In recognition of the conceptual character of our paper, we conclude by outlining potential practical applications and theoretical implications of the model and of the propositions. Limitations and avenues for further research are discussed. (shrink)

It is argued that (1) the alleged violation of the auspices by both the Consuls of 249 B. C. did in fact occur and (2) resulted in separate prosecutions directed at each of them; (3) the name ‘Pullius’, reported for one of the plebeian Tribunes that prosecuted P. Claudius Pulcher, is probably authentic; (4) the cognomen of L. Iunius Pullus is not spun out the violation of the auspices attributed to him and his colleague; and (5) the cognomen ‘Pulcher’, (...) first born by the Consul of 249, may actually derive from his drowning of the Chickens. (shrink)

The Battle of Drepana in 249 b.c. marks the most significant defeat of Roman naval forces at the hands of their Carthaginian opponents during the First Punic War. Attempting to take the Punic fleet in the harbour of Drepana by surprise, the consul P. Claudius Pulcher sailed with his ships from Lilybaeum about midnight, and reached Drepana at dawn. Yet, owing to swift and level-headed counter-measures taken by the Punic commander, Adherbal, the unfolding fight – partly in the harbour, (...) mostly off the shore – turned into a fiasco for the Romans. The consul got away; he returned to Rome, where the Senate instructed him to appoint a dictator. How soon he returned, and by what route, is the question. (shrink)

It is generally believed that Polybios mistook L. Iunius Pullus (cos. 249) for one of the consuls of 248 B. C. The internal evidence of Polybios’ narrative shows clearly that he knew the correct year of Iunius’ consulship, and inadvertently created a false impression of the date by structuring his account so as to tell the story of the Roman siege of Lilybaeum without interruption, from its inception in 250 to Claudius Pulcher’s defeat at Drepana in the following year. (...) This narrative objective led him to postpone the paragraph (1.52.4-5) detailing the Roman reaction to the disastrous siege operations of 250 and the consular elections for 249 until after his account of Drepana, without considering how such an arrangement could mislead readers two millenia hence. (shrink)

Kratochwil argues that a social-scientific study of the behavior of regimes, and how they exercise power, is a useful method to challenge the exaggerated view of international relations as a "normless anarchy.".

Praxis investigates both the existing practices of international politics and relations during and after the Cold War, and the issue of whether problems of praxis can be subjected to a 'theoretical treatment'. The book comes in two parts: the first deals with the constitution of international relations and the role of theoretical norms in guiding decisions, in areas such as sanctions, the punishment of international crimes, governance and 'constitutional' concern, the second is devoted to 'theory building'. While a 'theorization' of (...) praxis has often been attempted, Kratochwil argues that such endeavours do not attend to certain important elements characteristic of practical choices. Praxis presents a shift from the accepted international relations standard of theorizing, by arguing for the analysis of policy decisions made in non-ideal conditions within a broader framework of practical choices, emphasizing both historicity and contingency. (shrink)

This article reviews Wiliam Bains book and places it in the wider discussion of seciularization vs. secularism taking place in the social science. in general.

This paper explores what is apparently a non-topic for Luhmann. Luhmann is preoccupied with decision-making rather than with judgment. The paper argues that Luhmann, attempting to find a way out of the dilemma between the fundamentalism of positivistic legal theory and the relativism of anti-foundationalist post-modern thinking, presents the epistemological–ethical doublet of a “self-binding” of the law. In this bootstrapping manoeuvre decision plays the central part. The paper begins by examining judgment in its relation to decision as considered by non-system-theoretical (...) thinking. Against that background it unfolds the distinction between distinction, form and decision in systems theory and in the system-theoretical observation of the law. The article then discusses Luhmann’s description of the functioning of decision(-making) within the legal system. The hypothesis is that Luhmann blends here cognitive with ethical aspects. Finally, the article addresses Luhmann’s polemics against alternative approaches to his own. The suggestion is that ‘judgment’, in Luhmann’s systems theory, re-enters by the back door as an ethical–theoretical imperative that commands theory’s responsibility for society and law. (shrink)

Friedrich Kratochwil's book explores the role of law in the international arena and the key discourses surrounding it. It explains the increased importance of law for politics, from law-fare to the judicialization of politics, to human rights, and why traditional expectations of progress through law have led to disappointment. Providing an overview of the debates in legal theory, philosophy, international law and international organizations, Kratochwil reflects on the need to break down disciplinary boundaries and address important issues in (...) both international relations and international law, including deformalization, fragmentation, the role of legal pluralism, the emergence of autonomous autopoietic systems and the appearance of non-territorial forms of empire. He argues that the pretensions of a positivist theory in social science and of positivism in law are inappropriate for understanding practical problems and formulates an approach for the analysis of praxis based on constructivism and pragmatism. (shrink)

Kratochwil argues that a social-scientific study of the behavior of regimes, and how they exercise power, is a useful method to challenge the exaggerated view of international relations as a “normless anarchy.” By showing how “expectations” dictate action in international affairs, his method asserts the existence of a universal force among nations.

This paper examines the role of performance in law and music as a structural means of their self-programming construction. Music and law are considered as parallel social practices or performative doings. The paper begins with a critical analysis of the special aesthetical features of present-day juridical practice as exemplified by legal trial and legal expertise. Drawing upon reflections on the modern discourse on aesthetics and art, the article then examines in greater detail the specific traits of performance in law and (...) jazz music. Performative processes move from representation to presentation, from a preoccupation with rules and controlling to induced self-programming. Both law and jazz regard the unknown future as a resource for present decisions by “inventing” new possibilities; both require, expand and promote a responsibility that does not follow from statutes nor can be expressed in a code of ethics. Finally, the article addresses the performance situation in jazz. Jazz being polyphonic and improvisational by nature, improvisation makes explicit tradition by staging the context dependency of its performance. It is mediated by the knowledge, the operational history and the communication of the participants. Jazz is an exercise in the possibilities of an “aesthetics of imperfection” which can open up new ways of seeing law and politics. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to use Johan Galtung’s notion of structural violence as aguide for linking society’s problems of processing social meaning to the very idea of law. At the heart of my interest is the discrepancy Galtung sees between real and possible social conditions. I will first focus on the specific character of violence as communication. I will then consider the consequences of the heterogeneity of the languages that law speaks. Law and everyday practice not only refer to (...) actions in different ways, but also constitute different actions through their references. Law thus acquires a double validity: an internal one, based on the consistency of its discourse, and an external one, derived from successful translations of practical certainties. While the former defies the assumption that law can be somehow resonant, the latter paves the way for a critical understanding of law. The final section argues that if practical reason aims to create just conditions, and law is meant to sustain life, its purpose cannot be the mere optimisation of the given. Law must address the totality of possible transformations, exploring contained but not yet realised models. (shrink)

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the publication of Niklas Luhmann’s (1927–1998) magnum opus Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie [14]. On the occasion, this Special Issue of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law celebrates the contribution of Luhmann’s thinking to our understanding of law, justice, and society.Luhmann’s work is wide open for argument. Some consider it the grand unified theory able to completely grasp social reality. Others see nothing but a substantially void conglomeration of analytical constructs (...) and “behaviouristic” descriptions joined together with “pseudo-empirism” [24, pp. 310, 313] or a hermetic ensemble of “self-mystifying semantics” [7, p. 76] supported by sophisticated strategies of pure self-apology. It might seem that the “giant” [1] theorist of the social has encouraged such impressions with pretensions which were “grandiose” in more than one respect [9, 23]. Indeed, readers who encounter systems theory for the first ti. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

»Fichte legt alles Gewicht auf den Weg und die Begründung und nicht auf das, was schon ist, als solches, d.h. auf die darin beschlossene Grundfrage, was das ist -- das endliche Ich, das schon ist --, und wie es denn schon ist. Fichte gibt -- und das ist der Grundzug der Metaphysik als Wissenschaftslehre -- der Gewißheit den Vorzug vor der Wahrheit.«.

»Fichte legt alles Gewicht auf den Weg und die Begründung und nicht auf das, was schon ist, als solches, d.h. auf die darin beschlossene Grundfrage, was das ist -- das endliche Ich, das schon ist --, und wie es denn schon ist. Fichte gibt -- und das ist der Grundzug der Metaphysik als Wissenschaftslehre -- der Gewißheit den Vorzug vor der Wahrheit.«.